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Abstract. This paper provides a formal framework for developing the idea of nor-
mative co-ordination. This idea is based on the assumption that agents can achieve
flexible co-ordination by conferring normative positions to other agents. These po-
sitions include duties, permissions, and powers. In particular, we introduce the idea
of declarative power, i.e. the capacity of the power-holder of creating normative po-
sitions by simply “proclaiming” such positions. We account also for the concepts of
representation – the representative’s capacity of acting in the name of his principal –,
and mandate – the mandatee’s duty to act as the mandator has requested.
1 Introduction
The idea of normative co-ordination is based on the assumption that agents can achieve flex-
ible co-ordination by conferring normative positions to other agents. Those positions include
not only duties and permissions, but also powers, as for instance powers of creating further
normative positions on the head of other agents. In particular we will characterize three ideas.
First, the idea of declarative power, i.e., the capacity of the power-holder of creating norma-
tive positions, involving other agents, simply by “proclaiming” such positions. Second, the
idea of representation, which consists in the representative’s capacity of acting in the name
of his principal. Third, the notion of mandate, which corresponds to the mandatee’s duty to
act as the mandator has requested. These notions do not exhaust the domain of normative
co-ordination. However, they indeed belong to the basic building blocks for specifying the
relations and interactions between a user and its agents, and between autonomous agents.
The notions of power, representation and mandate originate from a legal background: we
can find them in every legal system, though they may be differently regulated. We focus on
their most general aspects, which are common to most legal systems.
2 Contractual Liberty: Declarative Power, Representation and Mandate
The declarative power provides a general facility through which autonomous agents can shape
their own normative environment. Indeed, autonomous agents (in the legal sense of “private
autonomy”) must go beyond activating institutional connections between pre-determined ac-
tions and results: they must be empowered to state what normative relations they want to hold
among them, and to achieve those effects by doing so. This is performed by a “declaration
of will”: the interested agents state the results to achieve, in the appropriate form, and the
institution within which they are operating makes so that those results are achieved.
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Such an empowerment of autonomous agents also corresponds to the needs of a self-
organising society, where it is not possible to establish in advance all normative relations
between agents: it is left to agents themselves to decide what normative relations are required
for the fulfillment of their tasks. In the law, this normative self-organization typically happens
through contracts (a contract is a declarative act jointly performed also by all parties whose
status is going to be changed by the declaration they are performing). For example, the Italian
civil code art.1321 establishes that “the contract is the agreement between two or more parties
to create, regulate, or extinguish any legal relationship between them”. This means that the
parties create legal positions (duties, powers or rights), extinguish them, and transfer them
(e.g., property rights) from one party to another. Note that the law does not establish what
changes a contract will make to the legal positions of the parties: it is up to the latter to
establish those changes, and the law will in principle recognise their will, i.e. producing those
results that the parties state in the contractual terms (the law can integrate and modify some of
those results though). This explains why contracts usually cannot be exhaustively classified
as of the types of acts which theories of institutional acts usually distinguish (commissive,
commands, etc.): a single contract usually, at once, establishes new normative positions. In
fact contracts put into focus a new dimension of autonomy: private or contractual autonomy,
by which one means the possibility of realizing the legal effects the parties wish, just by
stating those effects.
An agent empowered to make the type of statements we have just described, may not
be in condition of directly exercising this power. However, there is no need to impose a
regulation from above: an autonomous agent must rather be able to delegate to agents the
exercise of his own powers. So autonomy is further enhanced by instrument of representation,
which basically concerns the situation “where a principal is held to declarations, especially
contracts, made on his behalf” [37]. The essential aspect of representation is the grant of
an authority or of a power: the representative’s declarations can directly bind the principal,
since they count as if they were the principal’s declarations. In most cases, one subject confers
representation to another, by accompanying it with a mandate, i.e. the obligation of exercising
(and in a certain way) the power of representation. So, the idea of mandate concerns instead
the situation where one agent (the mandator) commands another agent (the mandatee) to do
something on his account. Usually a mandate presupposes that the mandator has authority
over the mandatee, or that a contract has been signed between them for the execution of a
specific business. Therefore, the mandator’s requests generate the mandatee’s duty to act in
such a way as the mandator has requested, in order to achieve the goals of the mandator.
3 Connections among Declarative Power, Representation and Mandate
The notion of declarative power is the basic one. Representation is usually created by an exer-
cise of such a power, and so is a mandate. Additionally, it is not uncommon that representation
and mandate go together with each other: whenever a principal confers an agent the power
to represent her, usually the principal also binds the agent so that he acts in certain ways, or
there is a legal relation providing the background for the exercise of the representation.
It is possible to have representation without mandate (the agent has the power to act in the
name of the principal, without the obligation to do so). As the American Restatement of the
law of torts affirms: “It is not essential to the existence of authority, that there be a contract
between the principal and the agent and that the agent promise or otherwise undertake to
act as an agent”. Consider the situation when one person confers to a relative the power of
representing her in the sale of her house. The relative may not be obliged towards his principal
to exercise this power (assume that he tells her: “If I have time enough I will go to the notary
Declarative Power, Representation, and Mandate. A Formal Analysis 43
and sell the house in your name, but I undertake no obligation to doing that”). He may just
be permitted to do that (she relies on his goodwill for accomplishing this task). What usually
accompanies representation, besides the power of the representative, is his duty to exercise
this power (if he decides to do so) to satisfy the interest of his principal (see e.g. the Italian
Civil code art. 1388).
Representation still exists when the representative acts against the interest of the princi-
pal. Though there is an “abuse of representation”, the contract concluded by the representa-
tive binds the principal (the contract is only voidable if the counterparty knew, or should have
known, that the representative was acting against the duty assigned by the principal). How-
ever, the representative may be obliged to compensate the principal for the losses incurred
because of his abuse. The situation where the representative acts against any duties he may
have towards the principal, but does an act which is within his power, must be distinguished
from the situation where the representative lacks the power of representation or acts beyond
such power. In this case the contract will generally not be effective in regard to the person in
the name of which the representative affirmed he was acting.
One important aspect of representation is that representative does not limit his contribu-
tion to the transmission of a declaration which was prepared by the principal in advance.
Usually, on the contrary, the principal elects a representative because she does not know how
she should best handle the business she has entrusted to the representative, in the circum-
stance where this business will take place. When the representative decides to perform a
transaction in the name of his principal, this is the representative’s own decision, so that his
contractual declaration expresses his own intention, as determined by his goals and beliefs.
In other words, beyond those specific conditions that were predetermined by the principal,
the transaction is willed and decided upon by the representative.
4 Logic of Actions and Obligations
Our approach falls within the Kanger-Lindahl-Po¨rn [21, 26, 24] theory of organised inter-
action. Despite some limitations [12, 34, 29], such an approach seems well suited for our
purposes because actions are viewed at a very abstract level and are taken to be relation-
ships between agents and states of affairs. In addition, it is permitted to easily combine action
concepts with other (normative) modalities.
Here, it suffices to use the well-known action operator Ei, employed in expressions like
“EjA” to mean that “agent j brings it about that A”. In addition to this classical reading, we
extend the formalism to cover also collective actions1. As suggested in [24], for the purpose
of this paper it is sufficient to index E by sets of agents [10]. So, E{i,j,k}A means that i, j, k
collectively bring it about that A. Investigating the nature of collective agency is outside the
scope of this paper. Thus we refer to the basic properties of E as described in [31, 32] but
simply extended to the case of sets of agents. For example, the axiom stating that E is a
successful operator is reformulated as EXA→ A, for any set of agents X2.
What about obligations? It is well-known that Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) is not ade-
quate for combining deontic and action operators. For example, in SDL OEXA implies that
OA, which is unacceptable: that X is obliged to bring it about that A should not entail that
1The issue of collective action and cooperation is greatly discussed in the recent literature. For a recent
extension of the E logic to cover collective agency, see [10].
2When the set of agents is a singleton, the logical meaning ofE{j} collapses into that of the usual expression
Ej . For cases with more than one agent, such as E{i,j,k}A, we assume that neither E{i,j,k}A implies that each
agent in {i, j, k} brings it about that A, nor the converse: a collective action to achieve a goal is qualitatively
different from a sum of actions performed to achieve the same goal by the single agents belonging to the group.
See, e.g., [11, 4, 30].
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A is in general obligatory. For similar reasons, OEXEYA → OEYA, which is a theorem
of SDL, cannot be accepted because the obligation on X should not imply an obligation on
Y [29]. We will not enter here into a discussion about which axiomatisation is suitable for
modeling deontic concepts. The only thing we need is to make provision for directed deon-
tic operators for obligation and permission. We simply write OjE{k}A to mean that k has,
towards agent j, the obligation of realising A (on directed obligations, see [17, 22], though
they provide a different formalisation). We assume that obligations satisfy Agglomeration
and Consistency, and are closed under classical logical equivalence [19, 15]. We also accept
the usual interdefinability between obligation and permission.
5 The ‘Counts as’ Link
We need also a way of expressing connections holding in the context of an institution. Jones
and Sergot (JS) [20] have developed a formal approach to the notion of institutionalised power
by introducing a conditional connective ‘⇒s’ to express the ‘counts as’ connection holding
in the context of an institution s as described, e.g., by [33]. This idea occurs in the law mainly
in two contexts: when the law specifies that a certain brute fact counts as a certain type of
legal act and when a certain legal act has the same legal effects of another legal act [15].
JS characterise the logic for ⇒s as a classical conditional logic plus the axioms ((A ⇒s
B) ∧ (A ⇒s C)) → (A ⇒s (B ∧ C)) and ((A ⇒s B) ∧ (C ⇒s B)) → ((A ∨ C) ⇒s B).
In addition, JS’s analysis is integrated by introducing the normalKD modality Ds such that
DsA means that A is “recognised by the institution s” [32]. Accordingly, it is adopted the
schema (A ⇒s B) → Ds(A → B), which in combination with (A ⇒s B) → (A → DsA)
allows for a restricted version of detachment of the consequent of ⇒s (modalised by Ds).
As argued elsewhere, although this approach provides an interesting account of the counts-
as link, it suffers of one limitation. In fact, the consequences of counts-as connections fol-
low non-defeasibly (via the closure of the logic for modality Ds under logical implication),
whereas defeasibility seems a key feature of such connections [15]. Our characterisation of
the counts-as adopts a different perspective. Rather than introducing a logic for the counts-as
connection, and then linking it with a Ds logic, we use one conditional operator⇒ to express
any defeasible normative connections or constants, in any institutions. We argued that the
type of non-monotonic reasoning involved in the institutional and the normative domains is
essentially the same [15]. Accordingly, we use the same Ds operator as in [20] but we apply
it to the components of normative links, to relativise them to a particular institution. We stress
that any institution can only state what normative situation holds for itself, given certain con-
ditions, but according to a general type of conditionality. In particular, on the basis of ⇒ we
can define a relativised operatorVs operator, which behaves similarly to ⇒s of JS. For this
purpose we combine a link A ⇒ DsB from a brute fact to an institutional fact, and a link
DsA⇒ DsB from an institutional fact to another institutional fact:
(AVs B) =def (A⇒ DsB) ∧ (DsA⇒ DsB) (1)
As shown elsewhere [15], the connective ⇒ is characterised by the normal conditional logic
CU [3] corresponding to cumulative reasoning. In addition, the account of counts-as link
requires the axiom schema Or, i.e., (A⇒ C)∧(B ⇒ C)→ (A∨B)⇒ C) [20]3. The system
is completed by introducing a restricted version of the detachment of the consequent based
3Notice that this property is accepted in its deontic version, e.g., in the Hansson-Lewis account of conditional
obligations [23, 28]. The reader who does not like to add it to CU can adopt its variant forVs
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on specificity [15]4. Finally, let us remark, that thoughVs is relative to a certain institution s,
we do not need to specify this since we are considering just one institution (the legal system).
6 Proclaiming
The notion of proclaiming is used to cover all those acts by which a subject makes a statement
expressing a certain proposition, and this statement has the function of making this propo-
sition true. Such a notion is formalised by the modal operator proc. As for E, proc will be
indexed by sets of agents. In this way, procXA means that the members of X jointly proclaim
A5. Of course, proc is not necessarily successful: procXA is just an attempt to achieve A.
Whether it is successful or not, within a certain institution s, depends on whether s makes it
effective. For example, in legal systems children cannot validly undertake obligations. If j is
a child and she proclaims that she assumes an obligation, no obligation for j will be created
according to the law.
A proclamation has some intuitive logical properties. It seems that by proclaiming a con-
junction one also proclaims each conjunct, and vice versa:
proc{j}(A ∧B) ≡ (proc{j}(A) ∧ proc{j}(B)) (2)
In addition, when a set of agents X makes a joint proclamation that A, then each agent j ∈ X
makes such a proclamation6:
∀j ∈ X, procX(A)→ proc{j}(A) (3)
The converse is not generally valid, since it may be argued that a joint declaration is more
than a couple of parallel declarations having the same content. This type of speech act has
some interesting peculiarities.
First, it is neutral in regard to intention-based [16] and non intention-based theories of
speech acts [18]. By saying that j’s statement has the function to achieve A we do not specify
how the notion of function is to be characterized: it may be determined by the intention of the
speaker, by the intention attributed to the speaker by its interlocutor, by a shared convention,
etc. What is sufficient, here, is that the act has a word to world direction of fit ([36]), i.e. it
has the function of changing the normative world to make it fit the content of the act.
Second, the idea of proclaiming is neutral in regard to what is proclaimed. So proc can
play the function vested by different speech acts:
(a) proc{j}(OkE{j}A) (b) proc{j}(OjE{k}A) (c) proc{j}(¬OkE{j}A) (4)
Here (4a) is j’s attempt to commit itself towards k, (4b) is j’s attempt to command k, and
(4c) is j’s attempt to free itself from an obligation towards k.
7 Declarative Power
Proclamations are not necessarily effective. When an agent j proclaims A, j brings it about
that A only if the concerned institution s provides for this result. This means that within s a
4This is an important property since we want to detach the consequent modalised byDs when the antecedent
(a brute or another institutional fact) occurs.
5Also in this case, when X has only one element i, procXA means that A is proclaimed personally by i.
6We are aware that this a debatable assumption. It might be argued that such an implication holds only if the
proclamation of a set of agents consists of a set of parallel utterences performed in the presence and with the
awareness of the others.
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rule must hold having the following content:
proc{j}(A)V E{j}A (5)
In other words, for the institution, j’s proclamation that A counts as j’s action producing A.
Note that according to the action logic above presented, E{j}A implies A. Therefore when
proc{j}(A) is effective, A follows in the domain of the institution. Rules stating that a procla-
mation is effective can be seen as a type of power-conferring rules. By a power-conferring
rule, we mean any rule stating that the action A counts as (in the concerned institution) the
performance of an action B [20], i.e. any rule having the form E{j}AV E{j}B.
Not every power is exercised through a proclamation. It may also be the case in which an
institution links a specific outcome to a specific action: consider for example the connection
between raising one’s hand in an auction and making an offer. The peculiarity of proc consists
in its generality: it may produce any state of affairs which is the object of the proclamation.
When an institution provides for the effectiveness of a proclamation that A, we say that
the subject j of the proclamation has a declarative power DeclPow{j}A, which corresponds
to accepting (5) as true. Therefore, that an agent j has the declarative power of producing A
means that if j proclaims that A then j produces A.
8 Empowering Autonomous Agents
A fundamental aspect of a norm-governed society consists in the allotments of permissions
and obligations to its members. However, in an autonomous society the agents themselves
must be able of creating those permissions and obligations. The decisive aspect of an au-
tonomous social organization consists in the empowerment of its agents, that is in establish-
ing how agents may create what normative relations. In our model agents are empowered by
attributing them declarative powers. This enables agents to create the normative relations and
to co-ordinate their behaviours. The failure to provide a viable allocation of such powers may
threaten the survival of society. For example, if each self interested agents were given an un-
limited power to unilaterally create obligation on the head of other agents, society will soon
collapse, since everybody would soon be covered with an unsustainable workload, obligations
will no longer be fulfilled, conflicts will explode, and trust will fade away. In the following
we will sketch some features of a viable allocation of powers, which gives each agent the
maximum of power consistent with the attribution of the same power to other agents.
Multi-lateral Proclaims (Contracts) A declarative power may be jointly exercised by more
than one party. If so, the proclamation will be an action performed by a set of agents. In
very general terms, we may call such an action a contract. For example the making of a
contract through which j takes the obligation towards k to provide a piece of music m and
k undertakes the obligation toward j to pay the price p, can be represented by the following
proclamation7:
proc{j,k}(OkE{j}(deliver(m)) ∧OjE{k}(pay(p))) (6)
Such joint proclaims are usually performed by two acts, the first of which is called offer, and
the second acceptance. This combination is considered as a joint declaration (even when there
7Notice that our reading is different from that proposed, e.g., by Herrestad and Krogh [17]. They view a
contract relation as follows: OiEiB ∧ OjEiB. The first conjunct is an ought-to-do statement expressing that
i has the obligation to do B; the second corresponds to an ought-to-be statement saying that j requires i to
perform B. We think this approach is intuitively unsatisfactory since it lacks to make explicit a strong logical
relation between the two conjuncts. We solve this problem by saying that the conjunction of directed obligations
is proclaimed jointly by both parties.
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is a delay between offer and acceptance). So we may want to say that the combination of an
offer and an acceptance counts as making a contract:
offer {j},{k}(A,B) ∧ accept{j},{k}(A,B)V proc{j,k}(OkE{j}A ∧OjE{k}A) (7)
if j offers to k to make a contract with content A and B, and k accepts, this counts as making
the contract. If the parties have the power to make an effective contract, the joint declaration
generates the obligations for the parties involved in the contract:
proc{j,k}(OkE{j}A ∧OjE{k}A)V OkE{j}A ∧OjE{k}A (8)
The operators offer and accept are two committing declarative acts, that can be defined using
the non committing declarative acts proposal and agree.
proposal{j},{k}(A,B) = proc{j}(OkE{j}A ∧OjE{k}B) (9)
proposal{j},{k} is a declaration of j where she proposes to ascribe to herself the obligation
towards k to do A, and to k the obligation towards herself to do B. Similarly
agree{j},{k}(A,B) = proposal{j},{k}(A,B) ∧ proc{k}(OjE{k}B) (10)
means that k recognises j’s proposal and agrees to bind herself to the obligation towards j to
do B.
We are now able to introduce offer and accept formally.
offer {j},{k}(A,B) = (agree{j},{k}(A,B)V proc{j,k}(OkE{j}A ∧OjE{k}A)) (11)
j proposes the content of the contract to k and she is aware that the acceptance of it by k will
create the respective obligations.
accept{j},{k}(A,B) = offer {j},{k}(A,B) ∧ agree{j},{k}(A,B) (12)
In the same way accept indicates that k accepts committingly the legally binding offer of j.
Empowerment to Commit Oneself First we may consider giving every agent the power of
creating obligations for itself, i.e. the power of making effective promises, or of committing
itself. If our agents are autonomous, this power should be equally given to each of them. How-
ever, this may seem too liberal: j’s obligation, towards k to perform A implies the permission
toward k to perform that action. So, k’s consent seems to be required. We can propose a gen-
eral rule attributing all agents the power of committing themselves to other agents through a
contract:
∀j, k (DeclPow{j,k}(OkE{j}A)) (13)
which means that every couple of agents has the power of establishing any obligation between
them, simply by proclaiming it. In other words, we empower all our agents to make effective
promises (with the consent of the promisee).
Empowerment to Remit Obligations and Give Permissions It is reasonable to assign every
agent j the power of freeing any other agent k from obligations toward j, even without k’s
consent. For example, if j is no longer interested in k’s performance, j should be allowed to
free k from that performance. In fact, if j is able to look after itself and an obligation on k
was originally created to promote j’s interest, then j should be empowered to choose whether
to cancel that obligation or not:
∀j, k (DeclPow{j}(¬OjE{k}A) ∧DeclPow{j}(¬Oj¬E{k}A)) (14)
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Accordingly, this formula also enables an agent to give any permission towards itself.
∀j, k (DeclPow{j}(PjE{k}A)) (15)
So, for example, if agent j has the obligation towards k not to access a certain piece of infor-
mation, k has the power of permitting that j accesses the information, according to 15. This
is a very libertarian approach, but is appropriate for autonomous agents in the commercial
domain.
Empowerment to Command It would be unreasonable to give all agents the power of
commanding whatever action to any other agent. The power of commanding needs to be
restricted only to specific cases, such as when one agent is hierarchically superior to another.
A power of commanding held by superiors over inferiors would be conferred by the following
rule8:
∀j, k ((superior(j, k)⇒ DeclPow{j}(OjE{k}A))) (16)
Note that in many types of societies, further restriction would be opportune, if the boss is not
be a total dictator over its subordinates. A total power of commanding may be, however, the
right empowerment for a human user over its agents.
Empowerment to Renounce to Power It may seem reasonable to give agents also the power
to renounce to their powers. In general terms this would be expressed by the following general
empowerment:
∀j (DeclPow{j}(¬DeclPow{j}A)) (17)
Empowerment to Empower We give our agents a further chance to develop their societal
relationships if we give them the power of conferring a power. For example, the formula
below expresses the idea that j has the power of creating l’s power of creating the obligation
that k realizes A.
∀x (DeclPow{j}(DeclPow{l}(OxE{k}A))) (18)
What kinds of empowerment to empower can be allocated to our agents, according to a gen-
eral rule? A very liberal choice would consist in stating that each agent has the power of
giving other agents the powers he has for itself.
∀j, k (DeclPow{j}A⇒ DeclPow{j}(DeclPow{k}A)) (19)
So, for example, since each agent j has the power of committing itself according to 13,
according to 19, j also has the power of submitting itself to another agent k, giving k the
power to commanding j. This will be done via the following proclamation:
proc{j}((DeclPow{k}OkE{j}A)) (20)
Note that according to the definition above, when j gives to k a power which was previously
possessed by j, j does not lose its power: both j and k can now exercise it. Obviously,
empowerment may lead to cycles. Agent j1 empowers j2 to A, . . . , agent jn empowers j1 to
A. However, this is no problem, the latter empowerment simply is redundant, since j already
possessed that power (unless it has renounced its power when conferring that power to another
agent).
Recursive Empowerment We may confer our agents a further kind of power, which includes
both the power of conferring a power to create a normative position and also the power of




8For a formal treatment of hierarchies among agents in the current setting, see [15].
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This formula means that the holder j of the recursive declarative power is enabled to exercise
his power in two ways. The first capacity, DeclPow{j}(OjE{k}A), enables j to make so that
k is obliged to realise A. The second, DeclPow{j}(RecDeclPow{l}(OjE{k}A), enables j to
transfer to another agent l the same recursive declarative power which j possesses. The latter
is useful in those cases where an organization is developed in multiple levels, and the top level
wants to delegate not only the performance of the action, but also the command to perform
it. The exercise of this power may lead to cycles, but again, this is no problem (the agent who
started the cycle may consider having another try), or better it is a problem that it is up to the
concerned agents to solve, according to their view of their own interest.
Specific Limitations to Empowerment We have sketched the constitution of a liberal, or
better a libertarian society, where every agent is able to look after its interest, and where
any normative relation can be created via the consent of the interested parties. In legal in-
stitutions various limitations to individual freedom are provided, for a number of reasons:
preventing frauds, protecting the weaker party, preventing the parties from making mistakes.
Unfortunately, there is not much that we may say in general in regard to such limitations. It
depends on the particular institutions what exceptions are made to the libertarian framework
we sketched.
9 Representation and Mandate
On the basis of the notions previously introduced, we will now provide a formalisation of
representation and mandate.
Representation Representation enables an agent to act in the name of its user or in the name
of other agents. In the following, we always use the index j to refer to the principal and k
to refer to the j’s representative. First we may characterise representation itself as consisting
in the possession of a declarative power. The representative has the declarative power of
proclaiming that the represented person performs a certain proclamation:
proc{k}(proc{j}A)V E{k}(proc{j}A) (22)
that is, when k proclaims that j proclaims that A, this counts as k making so that j proclaims
that A. Using the DeclPow abbreviation, this can be expressed as DeclPow{k}(proc{j}A)
that is, k has the declarative power of making so that j proclaims that A. Let us now consider
what allocation of representative powers will be appropriate to the type of libertarian society
we have been so far defining. The most appropriate choice seems to be to give any agent the
power of conferring on any other agent k the power of representing itself, in regard to any
type of act:
∀j, k (DeclPow{j}((DeclPow{k}(proc{j}A)))) (23)
Every j and every k are such that j has the power of conferring to k the power of representing
j, in regard to any proclamation. Representation does not need to be conferred in relation
to a specific proclamation. It may concern any proclamation of concerning a certain type of
proposition. We have so far considered representation as the situation where k’s proclamation
counts as j’s proclamation. Another type of representation is also possible: k’s proclaiming
that A counts as j making so that A:
proc{k}(E{j}(A))V E{k}(E{j}(A)) (24)
This can be simplified in: DeclPow{k}(E{j}A). The second type of representation is nec-
essary when the representative substitutes a principal which would not be able to perform
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directly the activity which is delegated to the representative. Consider for example, the situa-
tion where only certain agents are empowered of making certain transactions. Agent j, which
has not the power of performing those transactions, can still confer a power of representation
to agent k, but this should not mean that k’s proclamations count as j’s proclamation, since
j’s proclamations would be ineffective. It should rather mean that k’s proclamations count as
j realisation of the proclaimed result. A further aspect normally involved in j’s representa-
tion, but which we cannot approach here, is k’s duty of acting for the interest of j, that is of
adopting j’s interests or goals as his own goal in the exercise of representation (see [6]).
Mandate We may say that a mandate is a proclamation to create the obligation of exercising a
declarative power, or the obligation to exercise this power in a specific way. The author of the
proclamation is called the mandator, and the bearer of the obligation is called the mandatee.
So, a mandate has the form:
proc{j}(OjE{k}A) (25)
where A consists in, or is related to, the exercise of a declarative power.
Usually, the conferral of a power of representation is accompanied by a mandate, which
obliges the representative to exercise the power of representation in certain ways. For exam-
ple, besides giving his agent the power of representing him in buying musical recordings, a
user may command the agent to buy a specific recording, from a retailer included in a list of
agreed retailers, below a certain maximum price, and so on.




This formula says that j proclaimed that his representative k can (in the name of j) acquire
for j the permission to download records, and put j under the obligation to pay to the vendor
l the corresponding price.
Since the mandate puts the mandatee under an obligation, according to the principles
here sketched, an effective mandate presupposes that either the mandator has the power of
commanding the mandatee (as expressed in 26), or that a contract between the mandatee
and the mandator is concluded. The legal notion of mandate includes further refinements: in
particular, k being the mandatee of mandator j in regard to an action usually also implies
that k should perform that action in the interest of j. It seems that this may require both
the obligation to perform this activity (for instance buying a certain house), and also the
obligation to act in such a way that this power satisfies j’s interests (buy the house at the
lowest price, with the best conditions, from a reliable seller, and so forth).
10 Conclusions and Related Work
This paper originates from two lines of research. The first concerns the legal positions, and
particularly the notion of power. The second concerns how normative positions are generated
through speech acts. In the first regard, we are particularly indebted to [20]. The idea of power
has been formalized also by [1] along similar lines. In regard to the link between speech acts
and normative positions, we refer to [18, 5, 35, 9], and for informal characterization of dele-
gation to [6]. The peculiarity of our work, however, lies in the attempt of substituting a unique
speech act (proclaiming) to model all speech acts which are characterised by a world to word
direction of fit, that is all speech acts which are intended to modify the institutional world.
Of course, a number of works have been put forward to give a formal account of speech acts
theory (see, e.g., [8, 36, 7]). More recently, a number of different agent communication lan-
guages have been devised [13, 14]. With respect to a great part of works on speech acts, our
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approach provides for a simpler framework for institutional performatives since the logic of
all institutional performatives is exhausted by the logic of the (modal) operator of proclaim-
ing. In this way, it is also permitted to easily combine speech acts with other formalisms such
as those described here.
Further work will address how to deal with conflicting normative positions arising from
the exercise of declarative powers (such conflicts are even implicit in certain types of acts,
such as when an agent cancels an obligation or renounces a powers). Various approaches are
suitable, such as that of making use of defeasible reasoning techniques [27]), or also of Event
Calculus as recently done by [2].
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